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HYPNOSIS AND CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS: LIFE IN THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT AND BEYOND
Rock v. Arkansas1
The purpose of this Note is not to embark on an extended discussion of
the pros and cons of the admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony. Nor is
it designed to provide a detailed, scientific description of the procedure.' In-
stead, this Note will give an overview of the use of hypnosis in criminal pro-
ceedings in the states which make up the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.3
The use of hypnosis in the Eighth Circuit centers upon two decisions. The
first is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas.'
Rock struck down an Arkansas rule which excluded hypnotically refreshed
testimony from any witness.' The second is the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal's view of hypnosis in its recent Little v. Armontrout decision (Little I1).
In Little II, the court held that Missouri's failure to provide an expert in hyp-
nosis to assist an indigent defendant in preparing his defense violated the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.1 These cases are more easily understood if
viewed against the background of a basic understanding of hypnosis and how
1. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
2. See M. ORNE, D. SOSKIs, D. DINGES, E. ORNE, & M. TONRYE, HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED TESTIMONY: ENHANCED MEMORY OR TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE? (Na-
tional Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Issues & Practices In Criminal
Justice, Jan. 1985) [hereinafter HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY]; Diamond,
Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 313 (1980); Sies & Wester, Judicial Approaches to the Question of Admissi-
bility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: A History and Analysis, 35 DE PAUL L.
REV. 77 (1985).
3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is made up of the federal district courts
in the states of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1980).
4. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
5. The witness in this case was also the defendant. Her testimony was limited to
those events which she remembered prior to the hypnotic session. Rock v. State, 288
Ark. 566, 568, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2704
(1987). See infra section 1I of text.
6. 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2857 (1988), vacating
and modifying en banc, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'g sub nom. State v. Little,
674 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985).
In Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Little 1], the
court held that defendant's due process rights had been violated in that the manner
hypnosis was used to hypnotically enhance the witness' memory was overly suggestive.
Id. at 1433.
7. 835 F.2d at 1243.
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courts treat it.
I. HYPNOSIS AND THE LAW
Hypnosis is an "altered state of awareness or perception."S Its goal, in a
legal context, is to help the hypnotized individual remember past events. For
example, one theory posits that individuals, at least on a subconscious level,
"record" all that they see. The process of hypnosis allows the individual either
to relive the event or observe it as if watching television.' 0 It also helps revive
normal memories lost due to "pathological reason(s), such as a traumatic neu-
rosis."" However, if used to refresh a witness' memory or discover details
where none existed, or to "verify one of several conflicting accounts,' 2 hypno-
sis is of little value.
Subjects who undergo hypnosis can create memories where there were
none. This is known as "confabulation.""3 Other problems which reduce the
reliability of hypnotically enhanced memories include an increase in a sub-
ject's suggestibility 4 and a susceptibility to leading questions.' 5 Finally, wit-
nesses will show much greater confidence that a belief is true while testifying
if that belief was recalled in a previous hypnotic state.'1 Despite these
problems, hypnosis experts have proposed guidelines to limit the risk of faulty
testimony, 17 and courts deal with hypnosis in three ways.
8. Sies & Wester, supra note 2, at 79 (citing W. WESTER & A. SMITH, CLINICAL
HYPNOSIS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 19 (1984)).
9. M. ORNE, D. DINGES & E. ORNE, THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS 3 (Na-
tional Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Research in Brief, Dec. 1984).
10. Id. at 3.
11. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 573-74 n.1, 708 S.W.2d 78, 82 n.l (1986),
vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (citing EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 325 (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984)).
12. Rock, 288 Ark. at 573-74 n.1, 708 S.W.2d at 82 n.1 (citing EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 324, 332).
13. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 2, at 10. Confabulation
is defined as: "The act of filling-in gaps in memory by fantasy or by actual memories
concerning events that occurred at another time. The term implies that the subject
fully believes his answers to be correct." Id. at glossary.
14. Id. at 21.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 24-27.
17. Dr. Martin T. Orne, a leading expert in the field, has proposed the following
seven guidelines:
1) Hypnosis should be conducted by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or an "equiv-
alently qualified mental health professional." The hypnotist should not be em-
ployed by the police and any information about the case should be provided to
him in writing. Id. at 43.
2) All meetings between the witness and the hypnotist, before, during and
after the hypnotic session, should be videotaped. This allows a court to review
the contact between the two for any prejudicial conduct by the hypnotist. Id.
at 43-44.
3) Only the hypnotist should be present with the witness during the session in
[Vol. 53
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The first approach is the per se exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony."8 In most of these cases, witnesses are limited to testifying only about
the memories they had before hypnosis.19 In the Eighth Circuit, the courts of
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska have adopted this rule.2 0
The problem with such an approach is that it excludes potentially reliable new
evidence.2 1 In addition, if a party cannot prove what the witness knew before
hypnosis, her testimony will be barred.
A second theory is the admissibility view. Under this view, hypnotically
enhanced testimony is always admissible. It is for the trier of fact to determine
the weight of the evidence and to assess the declarant's credibility.22 The prob-
lem with always admitting hypnotically enhanced or aided testimony is that no
order to avoid any inadvertent cues by third parties. Id. at 44-45.
4) A complete psychological evaluation of the witness should take place
before hypnosis, the witness should sign an informed consent statement and
all facts about the incident at that time should be relayed by the witness. Id.
at 45-46.
5) The hypnotic method used should be standard and the witness should be
allowed to freely narrate the event. The hypnotist must be careful not to lead
the subject into creating memories which do not exist. Id. at 46-47.
6) The hypnotist may leave the room before and during hypnosis in order to
receive any questions by observers. However, the tape should continue to run
and any questions should be in writing in order to preserve a record. Id. at 47.
7) During the post-hypnotic phase, the hypnotist should avoid making state-
ments which reinforce the subject's belief he will now remember new bits of
information. The witness, at this point, is still suggestible and should be ques-
tioned as to what he believed has occurred. Id. at 47-48.
18. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (1986), vacated and remanded,
107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (witnesses' testimony limited to pre-hypnotic knowledge); State
v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983) (allowed testimony of events known before
hypnosis and no limitations if no substantial change in knowledge after hypnosis); State
v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980) (excluded post-hypnotic testimony based on
the Frye test); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (excluded
post-hypnotic testimony in civil cases); State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d
500 (1983) (excluded hypnosis-enhanced testimony, but witness not incompetent be-
cause hypnotized during investigatory phase of case; can still testify as to what he knew
before hypnosis).
19. Rock, 288 Ark. at 576, 708 S.W.2d at 83; Seager, 341 N.W.2d at 431;
Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 771; Patterson, 213 Neb. at 692, 331 N.W.2d at 504.
20. See supra note 18.
21. Many of the courts which exclude the evidence do so based on United States
v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d
78 (1986); State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1980); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985). Frye held that
expert testimony must be based on scientific procedures which have gained "general
acceptance in the particular field. . . ." 293 F. at 1014. The problem with using the
Frye test is that "[w]hat is involved is eyewitness testimony which, whether refreshed
by hypnosis or not, is simply not the same thing as expert opinion deduced from a
scientific test." Sies & Wester, supra note 2, at 111.
22. Sies & Wester, supra note 2, at 89.
1988]
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safeguards are required to limit potential abuse.2" In the Eighth Circuit,
North Dakota is the only state that follows this theory.24
The third and final approach is the guarded admissibility approach as
articulated by the New Jersey case of State v. Hurd.25 There, the court set
forth guidelines that proponents of hypnotically-enhanced testimony must fol-
low before the testimony can be introduced. First, the proponent must inform
her opponent of her intent to hypnotize a witness.2 6 The proponent must also
provide a record and demonstrate that hypnosis was appropriate for the kind
of memory loss suffered. 27 To help the trial court assess the reliability of the
hypnotic session, the following six guidelines should be used:
1) A licensed psychologist or psychiatrist should carry out the procedure.
2) He should be independent.
3) Any information from the police should be in writing.
4) A detailed description of the facts should be obtained before the session.
5) A videotape should be made whenever the subject and hypnotist meet.
6) No one but the subject and the hypnotist should be present during the
hypnotic session.
28
An advantage to the guarded admissibility approach is that it is consis-
tent with Federal Rules of Evidence 403, which directs a court to weigh the
probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.2 9 It is also consistent
with the idea that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise
provided .... ." contained in the Federal Rules.3 0 The Hurd guidelines provide
the court with a foundation upon which to weigh the evidence. If the
testimony is not relevant, probative, or if it is highly prejudicial, a court can
23. Id. at 117. As an interesting side note, the Maryland court which established
the admissibility rule in Harding v. State in 1968, reversed its decision in 1983.
24. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983). The North Dakota Supreme
Court stated: "[H]ypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility." Id. at 151. The
court criticized guidelines set forth in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
See infra note 30. It claimed medical professionals were often more suggestive than
police officers according to defendant's expert testimony at trial. 337 N.W.2d at 150.
Furthermore, set guidelines for hypnotic procedures added an undeserved sense of cred-
ibility to the testimony. Id. at 150 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145,
160, 310 N.W.2d 306, 313 (1981), affd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982)).
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court felt that the best way to deal with the
hypnosis problem is to allow the testimony plus expert testimony from both sides and
allow the jury to decide. Id. at 151. The court did point out a number of facts it
deemed significant including: a valid need for hypnosis due to the witness' lapse of
memory, the session was conducted by a police officer with over 90 hours of formal
training, and the sessions were videotaped. Id. at 152.
25. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
26. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The procedures adopted were those pro-
posed by Dr. Martin Orne as expert for the defendant, opponent of the evidence. See
supra note 17.
29. Sies & Wester, supra note 2, at 122 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).
30. FED. R. EVID. 402.
[Vol. 53
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legitimately exclude it. Otherwise, it should be admitted.31 This approach was
adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sprynczynatyk v. General
Motors Corp.32
In Sprynczynatyk, the court considered three factors: (1) the degree to
which the Hurd-type guidelines were followed; (2) "the appropriateness of us-
ing hypnosis for the kind of memory loss involved"; and (3) whether "there
[was] any evidence to corroborate" the testimony.33 If the evidence is reliable,
the court can then balance its probative value against its prejudicial effect. 4
These three views of the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony
are evidentiary rules. They are the courts' means of balancing the value of the
evidence against its possible inaccuracies. The burden of evaluation can be
placed upon the judge, the trier of fact, or can be eliminated altogether. A
court's choice as to the adoption of one of these views and its placement of the
burden of evaluating such evidence can affect the rights of the parties to the
dispute. The sections that follow will focus upon how a court's rule of admissi-
bility affects the rights of criminal defendants. The pivotal question is how
their rights supercede a state's policy on hypnosis.
II. ROCK v. ARKANSAS
On July 2, 1983, an argument erupted between defendant Vickie Lorene
Rock and her husband. 35 When defendant tried to leave their apartment, her
husband grabbed and started choking her.36 When defendant escaped his
grasp, she grabbed a .22 caliber revolver .3 After being warned to stay away,
the husband again struck the defendant, a fatal mistake.38 The gun went off
causing a bullet to lodge in the husband's chest, thereby ending the argument,
and his life.39
A lapse of defendant's memory as to the specific details of the incident
prompted her counsel to recommend that she undergo hypnosis.40 The defend-
ant did not inform the trial court nor the prosecutor of the decision before the
hypnotic session.41 A "licensed neuropsychologist with training in . . . hyp-
nosis" conducted the session.42 An interview before hypnosis between the
31. FED. R. EvID. 401-03.
32. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986). The only
Eighth Circuit state court to fall in line with the Federal Court of Appeals is South
Dakota in State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 1988).
33. 771 F.2d at 1123.
34. Id.
35. 107 S. Ct. at 2706.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2706-07.
38. Id. at 2706 n.1.
39. Id. at 2706.
40. Id.
41. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. at 568, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
42. 107 S. Ct. at 2706.
1988]
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doctor and defendant was not taped but the actual hypnotic sessions were.43
The doctor took detailed notes on what defendant remembered before hypno-
sis. 44 While the hypnosis revealed no new information, Rock later recalled that
"she had her thumb on the hammer of the gun, but had not held her finger on
the trigger."'45 The gun went off when her husband hit her arm.46 Following
this revelation, an expert tested the gun. He corroborated defendant's story,
finding the "gun was defective and prone to fire, when hit or dropped, without
the trigger's being pulled.' 47
Upon motion by the prosecution, the Arkansas trial court limited the de-
fendant's testimony to "matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior
to being placed under hypnosis.' 48 In effect, defendant could only testify as to
those events contained in the doctor's notes and any police reports. The court
excluded any details about the earlier events of the day of the shooting,
whether enhanced by hypnosis or not. The prosecutor interrupted her testi-
mony with objections many times.49 Although the gun expert was allowed to
testify as to the weapon's defective condition,5" his testimony was obviously not
enough to vindicate the defendant. She was convicted of manslaughter, sen-
tenced to ten years in jail and fined $10,000.51
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 2 In an
extended discussion of the pros and cons of hypnosis, the court rejected a
guarded admissibility approach to hypnotically enhanced testimony and opted
for the per se exclusion of the evidence.53 It deemed the trial court's testimo-
nial limits as applied not only proper, but generous.5' As far as the alleged
violation of defendant's right to testify was concerned, the court reasoned that
the "testimony was restricted only by what, in effect, are standard rules of
evidence." 55 Given the unreliability of hypnosis, the probative value of the evi-
dence was "questionable" and legitimately excluded.5" One may strongly infer
that the Arkansas court's failure to recognize any constitutional violation in
part arises from the fact that the limits directly arose from the defendant's
own conduct. Had she not sought hypnosis, no limits could have been
43. Id. at 2706-07.
44. Id. at 2706.
45. Id. at 2707.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari xvii).
49. Id. at 2707 n.4.
50. Id. at 2707.
51. Id.
52. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. at 568, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
53. Id. at 573, 708 S.W.2d at 81.
54. Id. at 577, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
55. Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
56. Id. The court stated: "In reality nothing was excluded that would have been








The job of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari was not to
establish whether hypnosis should be admissible or to create a standard for its
use. The ultimate question was whether a per se rule of exclusion was uncon-
stitutional.5 8 The Court's analysis focused on four questions: (1) Is there a
constitutional right to testify? 59 (2) May rules of witness incompetency be ar-
bitrary? 60 (3) Is the Arkansas per se rule of exclusion arbitrary?"1 and (4) Did
the Arkansas rule adversely affect the defendant's right to testify? 62 In es-
sence, the court merely applied the facts of the case (questions 3 and 4) to the
pre-existing law (questions 1 and 2).
(1) Is there a constitutional right to testify? Yes, based on the four-
teenth, sixth, and fifth amendments.6 3 The fourteenth amendment ensures a
right to procedural due process" and "an opportunity to be heard in [one's]
defense." 65 The sixth amendment, as applied to the states through the four-
teenth, guarantees "a defendant the right to call 'witnesses in his favor.' "66
"Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses whose testimony is
'material and favorable to his defense' is a right to testify himself, should he
decide it is in his favor to do so." ' Finally, the United States Supreme Court
asserts the right to testify is a "necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against compelled testimony."6 8 Given these three constitutional ba-
ses for a defendant's right to testify, Rock had such a right. The next question
deals with rules that limit the right.
(2) May rules of witness incompetency be arbitrary? No. Rules which
57. Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 85-86.
58. 107 S. Ct. at 2710.
59. Id. at 2709-10.
60. Id. at 2710-11.
61. Id. at 2712, 2714.
62. Id. at 2712.
63. Id. at 2709-10.
64. Id. at 2709 n.9.
65. Id. at 2709 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). The Rock
court restated the proposition: "The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law
include a right to be heard and to offer testimony." Id. at 2709. See also Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
66. 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19
(1967)).
67. Id. at 2709 (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867
(1982)). The Court relies on three cases to support its "logical" conclusion that the
defendant's right to testify is grounded within the sixth amendment. Such a right is an
outgrowth of two premises:
(1) A defendant has the right to call witnesses which favor his defense.
Washington, 388 U.S. at 17-19; Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867.
(2) A criminal defendant has the right to represent himself and "personally
' * * make his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
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limit a criminal defendant's ability to testify may not be arbitrary.8 9 "In ap-
plying its evidentiary rules a state must evaluate whether the interests served
by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right
to testify."' 0 In this vein, the Supreme Court relied on Washington v. Texas1
to conclude that a per se rule of exclusion, based solely on a fear of perjury,
which prevented a defendant's witness from testifying was unconstitutional."2
Further, in Chambers v. Mississippi" the court stated that an evidentiary rule
may "not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 1 47 Accord-
ingly, a state "may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take
the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony. 1 75 Given
that a state may not arbitrarily limit the right to testify, the inquiry focuses on
the extent to which the Arkansas rule was in fact arbitrary.
(3) Is the Arkansas per se rule of exclusion arbitrary? Yes. The per se
rule against hypnotically enhanced testimony ignored that evidence which cor-
roborated the defendant's post-hypnotic story and ignored the trial court's
ability to analyze the session by listening to the tapes .7 Essentially, the limita-
tion on the defendant's testimony was not wrong in and of itself. The constitu-
tional error arises when a court excludes the evidence without considering its
reliability. 1 As to such consideration, the Court commented that guidelines
could help trial courts evaluate the procedures surrounding hypnosis. 8
While the Court recognized the problems with hypnosis in the area of
reliability,79 the issue in the case was not the strength or weakness of hypnosis.
If the evidence has any value at all, evidentiary rules call for consideration of
probative value on a case-by-case basis. The Arkansas rule failed to do so.
Thus, in Rock the Supreme Court raised the probative value versus preju-
dicial effect test of the Federal Rules of Evidence to a constitutional level in
the area of criminal law.80 As applied to the testimony of criminal defendants,
a guarded admission approach becomes constitutionally required.8' This result
69. Id. at 2711.
70. Id.
71. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
72. 107 S. Ct. at 2710 (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 21).
73. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295-96. In Chambers the trial court refused to allow
a defendant to introduce evidence of a third party's confession to the same crime and
prevented the defendant from cross-examining the third party. The decision was based
on the Mississippi "voucher" rule later found violative of defendant's due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment.
74. Id. at 2711 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
75. 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
76. Id. at 2714.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court cited the guidelines from Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors
Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985) and State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981). See supra notes 27-28, 32 and accompanying text.
79. 107 S. Ct. at 2713-14.
80. FED. R. EvID. 403. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
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leads to the final question in the analysis.
(4) Did the Arkansas rule adversely affect the defendant's right to tes-
tify? Yes. The rule prevented the defendant from describing the shooting in
any manner different than described in the doctor's notes.s2 As well, the Court
felt that defendant's inability to tell the jury that her finger was not on the
gun's trigger severely limited the value of the gun expert's testimony.8 3 There-
fore, the per se rule limited the contents of defendant's testimony in an ex-
tremely relevant area and violated her right to testify. 4
The Rock case is not really a hypnosis case in the sense that it lays down
guidelines to be used before the evidence is admissible. Hypnosis was but the
vehicle the Court used to firmly establish a defendant's right to testify on his
behalf.85 Before this case "[w]hether a defendant . . . [had] a constitutional
right to testify [had] never been resolved authoritatively by the Supreme
Court. But while this right [was] not specifically expressed in the Constitution,
it has been frequently referred to in the Supreme Court's more recent deci-
sions." 86 Given the Rock decision, however, the right to testify has been au-
thoritatively decided. The potential effects of the decision go beyond the hyp-
nosis issue.
A second area of impact of the Rock case is the requirement that an
evidentiary rule, before applied against a defendant, must not be arbitrary. As
opposed to Chambers and Washington, Rock applied the "arbitrary rule" to
the defendant's testimony. So not only did Rock establish the right to testify,
but it as well set forth the means by which to attack evidentiary rules which
limit that right.
In other areas of evidence, the question of the applicability of Rock is yet
to be answered. For instance, "rape shield statutes" limit evidence of an al-
leged rape victim's prior sexual conduct.8 7 Do such statutes, which in effect
limit a defendant's testimony, now violate his right to testify? Can they now
be attacked as arbitrary? Do the "interests" of such statutes override a de-
fendant's rights under the fourteenth, sixth, and fifth amendments? These
questions will only be answered in time.
Insofar as Rock addressed the question of a defendant's right to testify in
a hypnosis situation, what about the use of hypnosis by the prosecution? The
next section will look at the flip side of Rock in the Eighth Circuit. As will be
shown, in the criminal law area there is more to hypnosis than adopting a
simple rule of admission or exclusion.
82. 107 S. Ct. at 2712.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2714-15. Although the Court did not explicitly comment, one wonders
about the weight placed by the Court on the fact that defendant's testimony was con-
tinuously interrupted by the objections of the prosecutor.
85. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
86. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.3(g) (1985).
87. See Note, The Missouri Supreme Court Confronts the Sixth Amendment in
Its Interpretation of the Rape Victim Shield Statute, 52 Mo. L. REv. 925 (1987).
19881
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III. THE LITTLE CASE8 8
The case of Leatrice Little is an excellent example of what can happen
when police hypnotize prosecution witnesses and do not follow safeguards. Not
only is a breeding ground for appeals created, but those appeals flourish.
M.B.G. was raped in her apartment on August 13, 1980.89 Although she
only saw the side of her assailant's face for approximately two to sixty
seconds, she agreed to undergo hypnosis two days after the attack.90 No new
information arose immediately after hypnosis. On October 16th and Novem-
ber 5th and 10th, police showed M.B.G. groups of photographs, none of which
contained defendant.91 She did pick out a man from the October 16th group
whom she said looked like, but was not, the attacker.9 2 Sometime in December
M.B.G. again underwent hypnosis because she was having sleep problems.
While hypnotized she did not discuss the case.9 3 Finally, on December 23,
1980, she picked Little's photograph out of another series. 94 A few days later,
the police showed M.B.G. two pictures of the defendant, and on January 26,
1981 she picked him out of a lineup.95 Little was arrested, found guilty of rape
and sentenced to 25 years in prison.96
This case is full of problems with respect to hypnosis: 97
(1) The hypnotist was not a neutral professional, but rather a police of-
ficer with only four days of training in hypnosis. 9 8
(2) The police made no record of the second hypnotic session. They did
tape record the first session, but, according to the then-police procedures, they
erased the tape fifteen days later. They also failed to make records of any
other contacts.99
88. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2857 (1988), vacating and modifying en banc, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'g
sub nom. State v. Little, 674 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1029 (1985). In subsequent references, Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir.
1987) will be known as Little L Its subsequent rehearing and new decision shall be
Little IL.
89. 835 F.2d at 1241.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1242.
92. Id.
93. 819 F.2d at 1427. The individual who conducted both hypnotic sessions was
a policeman, Officer B. J. Lincecum. Id. The court noted that "Officer Lincecum stated
that during the training course [in hypnosis] he attended he was taught not to use
hypnosis for therapeutic purposes." Id. at 1430 n.2.
94. 835 F.2d at 1242.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Compare the facts of this case to the guidelines proposed by Dr. Orne, supra
note 17, or adopted by State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), supra note 28
and accompanying text.
98. 819 F.2d at 1434.
99. Id. at 1427.
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(3) "[O]ther persons besides Officer Lincecum and M.B.G. were present
during the first session without any explanation as to why their presence was
necessary."' 00
(4) The officer kept no record of M.B.G.'s prehypnotic memory.'
(5) The technique used was the "T.V. screen" technique whereby the pa-
tient sits and imagines she sees the event as a third person.102
(6) The hypnotist kept no records of the information he received before or
during hypnosis, if any. 0 3
(7) After the session was over, the hypnotist told M.B.G. her memory
would improve.04
In addition, there was no evidence corroborating M.B.G.'s identifica-
tion. 10 5 The only evidence showing that the police made no improper sugges-
tions to M.B.G. was the testimony of the officer, of M.B.G., and of her sister
denying the existence of any suggestions. 06
Evidence which tended to exonerate Little included: 1) His own testimony
and that of friends placing him 78 miles away in another town at the time of
the rape;10 7 2) "Fingerprints found on the window ledge where the rapist ex-
ited the apartment [did] not match Little's;" 0 8 and 3) M.B.G. "initially de-
scribed her assailant as a young, broad-shouldered black, slender body, 145
pounds, 5 feet 7 inches tall, and between the ages of 16-20. Little was 25 years
old, 175 pounds and 5 feet 11 inches at the time of the attack."'' 09 She used
her own height of 5 feet 8 inches to gauge the height of the attacker.1 0 There-
fore, given the lack of physical evidence, the prosecution's key testimony was
M.B.G.'s in-court identification.
100. Id. at 1434.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1428.
103. Id. at 1434.
104. 835 F.2d at 1242.
105. 819 F.2d at 1434.
106. 674 S.W.2d at 542. There seems to be no evidence the police suggested
Little to be the rapist. The problems apparently aggravated by this case were confabu-
lation, pseudomemory and memory hardening. 819 F.2d at 1429-30. In fact, the Little
I court, whose decision was vacated, believed "source amnesia" could have been a prob-
lem in this case. Id. at 1430 n.12. Source amnesia is when an individual believes he is
recalling a fact, yet that fact does not really arise out of his memory. Id. at 1430
(quoting Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis in a Prospective
Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 336 (1980)). The court suspected "source amnesia"
because on some unknown date in December M.B.G. was hypnotized and then picked
defendant on December 23, 1980. Id. at 1230 n.12. Not knowing the date of this ses-
sion nor having a record of it and despite its alleged therapeutic purpose, the fact that
Little had become a suspect "sometime in November or December" may support their
suspicion. Id. at 1427.
107. 835 F.2d at 1242.
108. 819 F.2d at 1435.
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The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Little's conviction.111 The court
held that the police's destruction of the tapes was not intended to conceal and
was not prejudicial."1 2 The defendant presented no evidence that the hypnotic
sessions were suggestive nor that the hypnotist's qualifications led to any sug-
gestion.11 3 Finally, the defendant failed to show that the appointment of his
own expert in hypnosis would have been helpful.1 1 Little next sought habeas
corpus relief from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reversed the district
court's denial of the petition and granted Little a writ of habeas corpus, order-
ing that he either be retried or released. 15 The court held "that Little's right
to due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment was violated
by admitting the victim's posthypnotic identification testimony into evidence at
trial.' 16 Note that, although this case has been vacated, it is still an exercise
in how the court might, in the future, approach a prosecution witness' faulty
hypnotic session. While the Rock court used due process to aid a defendant in
presenting evidence of hypnosis, the Little court attempted to protect him
from its potentially adverse effects.
The Little I court decided that the overall effect of the hypnosis, plus the
failure to follow any safeguards, corrupted M.B.G.'s identification "both in the
lineups and at trial" to the point of being "constitutionally unreliable."" 7 The
court pointed to the safeguards of Hurd and its own decision in
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.11 8 as providing for the use of proce-
dural safeguards. The failure to ensure the reliability of hypnotically induced
testimony reduces its value to the point where its use constitutes constitutional
error.
1 9
111. 674 S.W.2d at 545.
112. Id. at 543.
113. Id. at 543-44.
114. Id. at 544. The court commented "There is a state university in Cape Gi-
rardeau with a faculty of psychology and library facilities, and we are confident that a
resourceful lawyer would not be helpless in obtaining expert information sufficient for a
preliminary inquiry, at little or no expense." Id.
115. 819 F.2d at 1435.
116. Id. at 1426.
117. Id. at 1433; see supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
118. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986); see
supra notes 28, 32-34 and accompanying text.
119. 819 F.2d at 1433-35. The court stated:
The suggestive identification procedure in this case is, of course, the use
of hypnosis in an attempt to improve M.B.G.'s recall. As noted, this circuit
has not determined whether, under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, hypnotically-enhanced testimony can be used by the prosecution
in a criminal case or, if allowed, what procedural safeguards must be com-
plied with. And, we do not have to answer those questions to decide this case
because the hypnosis of M.B.G. did not include any of the procedural safe-
guards required in jurisdictions which allow hypnotically-enhanced testimony.
[Vol. 53
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Had this case remained law, the constitutionality of a per se rule of ad-
mission of the prosecution's hypnotic evidence would have been questionable.
States with guarded admission rules would probably be subject to case-by-case
reviews while those with per se rules of exclusion would be unaffected. In any
event, Little I's rationale was rejected upon rehearing and a different constitu-
tional violation supported the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.120
On December 23, 1987, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc,
handed down a new opinion. Defendant Little had raised four points: 1)
M.B.G's identification of him was unreliable because of the hypnosis and vio-
lated due process (the same argument on which he had won four months ear-
lier); 2) His sixth amendment right to confrontation was violated because of
the use of hypnosis; 3) the destruction of the hypnotic session's tape violated
due process; and 4) his right to due process was violated because the trial
court refused to appoint a hypnosis expert for him. 21 The court held that the
panel's requirements that the hypnotic session contain safeguards and the
identification testimony be corroborated were not necessary to support an or-
der for a new trial . 2 2 Instead, it opted for defendant's argument number four,
the state's failure to appoint an expert. 23
The court based its decision on the Supreme Court cases of Ake v.
Oklahoma2 4 and Caldwell v. Mississippi.12 5 Ake was a capital murder case in
which the Court ordered that a psychiatric expert be appointed for the defend-
ant because his sanity was a major issue.'26 In Caldwell, the Court did not
rule if a "nonpsychiatric expert" was required, in essence because the defend-
ant failed to show his request was reasonable."27 The Little II court stated:
"[t]he question in each case must be not what field of science or expert knowl-
edge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case,
and how much help a defense expert could have given." '12 A defendant must
show a "reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense" and
Thus, even if we were to hold that such testimony was admissible, we would
not allow it in this case because of the lack of procedural safeguards.
Id. at 1433-34 (citation and footnote omitted).
120. 835 F.2d at 1241.
121. Id. at 1242-43.
122. Id. at 1243.
123. Id. The court stated:
In our view, the denial of a state-provided expert on hypnosis to assist this
indigent defendant rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and requires that
the conviction be set aside. We deem it unnecessary to address the broader
and more far-ranging issues about hypnotically enhanced testimony addressed
by the panel opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
124. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
125. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
126. 470 U.S. at 86-87.
127. 472 U.S. at 323-24 n.1.
128. Little I1, 835 F.2d at 1243.
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an unfair trial would occur without one. ' 29
The court believed an expert would have significantly aided Little in his
defense given the nature of hypnosis.230 It recognized that whether or not
M.B.G.'s memories are legitimate, she honestly believed they were. An expert
could cast doubt on those beliefs. An additional fact that probably helped the
court opt for more limited grounds for reversing Little's conviction was the
fact that Missouri no longer allowed hypnotically enhanced testimony.
In Alsbach v. Bader13 1 the Missouri Supreme Court barred the use of
hypnotically enhanced testimony, limiting testimony to those memories known
before hypnosis.'3 2 Given this new rule, the Little H court believed that with
the aid of an expert Little might have been able to convince the court that
M.B.G.'s testimony was the result of hypnosis, and thereby win exclusion of
the evidence.133 The court decided to use Missouri's own evidence law against
the state rather than invalidate the entire hypnotic process involved. Of course,
if the identification of Little is to be excluded, the trial court must not find the
hypnosis to be inconsequential. To find otherwise places defendant back on
trial armed with his newly found expert.
The Little I court had earlier stated that whether the state's use of hyp-
notically aided testimony against a criminal defendant was permissible had yet
to be decided in the circuit.' Little II failed to provide an answer. The court
did make clear, however, that the state's use of hypnosis must be in accord
with already established constitutional principles. At a minimum, the state
must provide experts to indigents. One striking fact about Little H is its fail-
ure to cite both the Hurd and Sprynezynatyk cases. The court obviously was
not as eager to elevate those cases' guidelines to the level of a constitutional
mandate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors and defense counsel must both recognize the risks of hypno-
sis. For defense counsel, the Rock case provides an opportunity to present evi-
dence in those jurisdictions which previously banned it; namely Arkansas,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska.' 35 If a state allows hypnosis, like
129. Id. at 1244.
130. It's not surprising the defendant failed to impeach the state's expert at both
the suppression hearing and at trial. Although the Missouri Supreme Court seemed to
believe that defense experts fall off the trees at the local university, they obviously don't
fall off for free. Defendant's counsel was reduced to trying to impeach the prosecution's
expert by way of a psychology textbook and any information he gleaned from an inter-
view with a local professor. Id.
131. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985).
132. Id. at 824.
133. 835 F.2d at 1245.
134. See supra note 118.
135. See supra note 18.
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North Dakota1 36 and South Dakota,'137 then there is a great opportunity to
attack the prosecution's evidence if the procedures are questionable under the
rationales of the Little cases.
Prosecutors also must play both sides of the street also. They must attack
the defendant's testimony on the grounds it is unnecessary, uncorroborated, or
suggestive (the same thing the defense will say about the prosecutor's evi-
dence). Prosecuting attorneys must learn to restrain the local police force or
risk losing valuable hypnotically enhanced testimony. Even if hypnotically en-
hanced testimony is allowed as a matter of law, hypnosis is a procedure that
should only be used rarely. The days of "Officer Friendly" and his "hypnosis
in ten easy lessons" are in jeopardy, as well they should be.
Hypnosis can be a powerful tool. It is a tool, like most, which can be
abused. At first glance, it may appear that per se rules of exclusion, combined
with the Rock and Little cases, tend to skew hypnotic evidence in favor of the
defendant. But regardless of the truth of such an appearance, all these rules
really do is bring the law up to date with the current state of science (or
pseudo-science). The idea of reliable evidence, the right to testify, to an ex-
pert, to due process, and to protection from arbitrary rules of evidence, has not
been created just for hypnosis. They are rules which existed, or at least their
foundations existed, a long time ago. Law, as an ever-evolving creature will
eventually come to grips with hypnosis. What the cases in this Note represent
are but a short view of the process.
DEAN R. GALLEGO
136. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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